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Interface between IP and Competition Law 
in Taiwan 
Kung-Chung LIU* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The modernization of Taiwan’s intellectual property (IP) laws has been most marked 
in the last 10 to 15 years.] During that period, Taiwan also responded to U.S. Section 301 
pressure by enacting and enforcing the Fair Trade Act of 1991, a general competition law. 
The issue of the interface between IP and antitrust law has gradually gained sigdcance 
in the last couple of years. To  some extent, as its development in Taiwan testifies, 
competition law has circumscribed the scope of IP laws and inacted a spd-over effect on 
the IP laws. The ramification of competition law in Taiwan with regard to the interaction 
with IP laws has, thus far, resulted in an accumulated body of experience whch, gven the 
interface role that Taiwan is playing in many industries, could perhaps be of use for 
countries at an equivalent level of development or facing a simdar situation. 
Totally unaware of the paradigm shf t  &om a pattern of weak IP laws (especially patent 
laws) and strong antitrust laws in the 1970s to the pattern of strong IP laws (especially patent 
laws) and weak antitrust laws in the 1990s in the United States2 and the European Union? 
the Taiwanese legislature has, mainly out of its habit of imitating Japan, introduced into the 
Fair Trade Act4 Article 45, which closely resembles Article 21 ofthe Japanese Antimonopoly 
Act (formerly Article 23). Article 45 of the Fair Trade Act reads: “No provision of this law 
shall apply to any proper conduct in connection with the exercise of rights pursuant to the 
provisions of the Copyright, Trademark, and Patent 
* Research Fellow with Ilytitutum Iurisprudentiae and Conjunct Research Fellow with the Center for 
Institution and Behavior Studies, Acadenua Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan; and Overseas Fellow, IP Academy, Singapore. 
1 The three fundamental IP laws in Taiwan-the Copyright Act, the Trademark Act and the Patent Act- 
were all substantially revised in 2003. The Copyright Act was again amended in 2004 to introduce, inter alia, the 
protection of technical measures. The English version of the Taiwanese IP laws is available on the Website of the 
Taiwanese Intellectual Property O&e, at: www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/laws/laws.asp). The Copyright Act is available 
at: (www.tipo.gov.nv/eng/!aws/e1-4-1 an93.asp,; the Trademark Act is available at: www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/ 
laws/tmlaw-e.asp); and the Patent Act is available at: www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/laws/patlaw-e.asp). 
2 See John H. Banon, Parents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light ofPatent Breadth and Sequenfial Innovation, 
65 Antitrust L.J. 449. 1997, at p. 449. 
3 As exemplified by the European Union block exemption clauses; see Andreas Heinemann, 
Immaterialgiiterschutr in der Weftbewerbsordnung: eine gmndlagenorientierte Untersuchung r u m  Kartellrecht des geistigen 
Eigentums, Mohr Sieheck, Tubingen, 2002, at p. 626. 
The author may be contacted at: diukc@gate.sinica.edu.tw). 
4 The Taiwanese Fair Trade Act is available at: ~www.ftc.gov.tw/20000101299901011374.htm~. 
5 The Taiwanese Legslature introduced this provision because: “Copyright, trademark right and patent right 
are legal monopoly in nature, therefore the proper conduct in connection with the exercise of nghts pursuant to 
Copyright, Trademark, and Patent Acts rxcludes the application of This Law.” SeeJoint Report on the Review ofthe 
DruJ Revision Act of the Fair Trade Act by the Committees opt Economic Afairs and on Judiciary, Legislative Yuan, 
79 Gazette (1980), Issue 96, No. 2416, p. 100. 
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The provision itself does not provide any clue as to how “proper conduct” is to be 
understood. However, the Taiwanese IP laws contain rules that deal with some aspects 
of the IP/competition law interface issue, such as parallel imports and compulsory 
licensing. The Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) has developed the principle 
of allowing parallel imports of trademarked goods as a general rule and laid down 
stringent rules on issuing warning letters alleging IP infringement. Recent case law of 
the TFTC shows that patentees can be held responsible for the abuse of monopoly power 
derived from their patent pool. In 2002, the TFTC also specifically adopted the essential 
facility doctrine in its guidelines entitled “How the Fair Trade Act Might Apply to 
Cross-Ownership and Joint Provision among 4C Enterprises”6 (hereinafter, the 4C 
Guidelines) .7 This article will examine these issues in the above-mentioned order. 
11. PARALLEL IMPORTS~ 
With the proliferation of parallel importation of genuine goods motivated by the 
substantial price differentials of the 1980s, the Taiwanese courts were flooded with cases 
which challenged the legality of parallel imports. In 1992, the Supreme Court 
unprecedently went beyond legal exegesis and touched upon economic theory. Indeed, 
Decision Number 2444 of 1992 niakes economic sense by asserting: 
“The parallel import of genuine goods may prevent the trademark owners from 
nionopolizing [the] domestic market, controlling prices, and may therefore facilitate price 
competition, and allow consumers to choose (from different sources) ofthe same goods, and 
enjoy the benefit of free competition.”g 
At roughly about the same time, the TFTC echoed its supportive opinion,’O which 
was later shared by the 1993 Trademark Act Amendment Act, adopting the “exhaustion 
theory”. The current Article 30(2) of the 1993 Trademark Act Amendment Act 
stipulates: 
“Where goods bearing a regstered trademark are traded or circulated in the marketplace by 
6 The term “4C enterprises” refers to the telCcoiiimuiiications, cable television, computer network and 
’ The 4C Guidelines are available at: ~~vww.ftc.gov.tw/20000101299912311597.1itm~. 
8 For a more detailed report on the parallel import rcginie 111 Taiwan, see Kung-Chung Liu, Exhaustiorr arid 
Parallel Imports i t ,  Taiwan, in Chrictophcr Heath (ed.), Parallrl 1mpurf.r in  Asia, Kluwer Law International, London, 
2004, at pp. 39-50. 
Decision number 5380 of 1993 reinforced the Supreme Court’s position: “The parallel import of genuine 
goods may prevent the market from being monopolized, facilitate intra-brand price competition, and allow 
consumers to enjoy the benefit of reasonable prices.” Kung-Chung Liu, Fair Trade h u l ,  Angel Publishing, Taipei, 
2003, at p. 302 (in Chinese). The Decisions of the Taiwan Supreme Court mentioned in this article, with the 
exceptioii of those adjudicated before 1995, are available on the Website of the Judicial Yuan, at: 
~www.~udiciaI.gov.tw). 
1” Explanation No. 3 of the TFTC says: “While importing goods, which have been authorized by the original 
producer to be imported by his agent or manufactured by other producers. if the importing company has by active 
meam misled consumers concerning the product’s contents, source, name and address so as to give the impression 
that the goods come from the agent, this is the so-called free-ride, then the ‘deception’ or ‘obviously unfair’ clause 
of Article 24 [‘In addition to what is provided for in this Law, no enterpnse shall otherwise have any deceptive or 
obviously unfair conduct that is able to affect trading order.’] is invoked, because the domestic agent has invested 
huge marketing costs or expenditures to make the goods widely known to consumers.” Explanation No. 3 of the 
TFTC Regarding the Legality of Parallel Import, 22 Apnl 1992; available at: cwww.ftc.gov.tw) (in Chinese). 
e-coinniercr industries. 
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the trademark right holder or by an authorized person, or are offered for auction or disposal 
by a relevant agency, the right holder shall not claim trademark rights on the said goods. 
However, the aforementioned shall not apply in case of preventing deterioration or damage 
of goods or any other fair reasons.”” 
Unfortunately, due to trade pressure from the United States, the other Taiwanese 
IP laws were forced to not follow the same logic. The Copyright Act was the first piece 
of legislation to principally ban parallel imports. According to Article 87(4) of the 
Copyright Act, the import of originals o r  reproductions of works without the consent 
of copyright holders is deemed to be an act in violation of the Copyright Act, thereby 
indirectly granting copyright holders the exclusive right to import copyrighted goods. 
Article 87bis of the Copyright Act provides several narrowly defined exceptions to the 
right to import,’* which, in combination with a decree promulgated by the competent 
authority, allows, for example, the parallel import of five copies of works (but only one 
copy of audiovisual works) for non-profit educational or archival purposes and, 
moreover, of one copy of a work for personal use and of one copy of a work as part of 
personal luggage brought back from abroad.13 
The provisions of the Patent Act are somewhere between the extremes of those of 
the Trademark Act and the Copyright Act. Although the Taiwanese Patent Act 
recognizes that the patentee of an invention, a utility model or a design, has the 
exclusive right to manufacture, sell, offer to sell, use, or import for the above purposes 
1 1  However, this leaves room for doubt. If it is for the preservation of the quality of goods, then it is an issue 
that should be and would better be dealt with by the Consumers Protection Act. Even if it is for the preservation 
of the goodwill of trademark right holders, it is not justifiable to grant trademark right holders a superior position 
over the property right of owners of the goods. If it is meant to protect trademark nght holders against an 
intentional damage of the goods by their owners in order to diminish the reputation of the former, then it can be 
sufficiently handled by either Article 22 (“No enterpnse shall, for the purpose ofcompetition, make or dissermnate 
any false statement that is able to damage the business reputation of another.”) or Article 24 of the Fair Trade Act. 
Furthennore, it is dubious how trademark nght holders can enforce their right over the goods owned by others- 
to prohibit the continued sale or use of tlic trademarked goods and sue over the continued sale or use of the goods, 
claiming infringement of trademark nghtc. 
Article 87bis of the Copynght Act, s u p ,  footnote 1, reads: “The provisions of subparagraph 4 of the 
preceding article do not apply to any of the following circumstances: 1. Importation of the original or copies of a 
work for the use of central or local government agencies; provided, this does not apply to importation for use in 
schools or other educational institutions, or iinportation of any audiovisual work for purposes other than archival 
use. 2. Importation of the onginal or a specified number of copies of any audiovisual works in order to supply such 
works to nonprofit scholarly, educational or  religous organizations for archival purposes, and importation of an 
ongnal  or  specified number of copies ofworks other than audiovisual works for library lending or archival purposes 
where the use of such copies confomis with the provisions of Article 48. 3. Importation of the original or a specified 
number of copies of a work, where such copy is for the private use of the importer, not for distribution, or where 
the import is  by a person arriving from outside the territory, as the copy fomis a part of such person’s personal 
baggage. 4. Importation of the onginal or copies of a work incorporated into any legally imported goods, 
machinery, or equipment; such onginal or copies of the work cannot be reproduced dunng the use or operation 
of the goods, machinery or  equipment. 5. Importation of an instructional or operational manual accompanying any 
legally imported goods, machinery, or equipment; provided, this does not apply where the instructional or 
operational manual are the pniicipal objects of the importation. The ‘specified number’ set forth in subparagraphs 
2 and 3 of the proceeding paragraph shall be prescribed by the competent authority.” 
Before 9 July 2003, violation of the right of importation was subject to two years imprisonment and/or a 
monetary penalty in the maximum amount of NTS 500,000 (Article 93(3) of the Copynght Act). However, the 
2003 Copynght Act has deleted the criminal sanction without giving any reason for doing so; seejoint Report on h e  
Review of the Drdt Revision Acf o j t h e  Copy+qht Act by the Committees of Economic Afairs and ofjudiciary, Legislative 
Yuan, 92 Gazette (1993), Issue 34, No.  3308, p. 156. 
738 THE JOURNAL OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
the patented matter o r  products that were derived directly from the patented method 
(Articles 56(1), 106(1) and 123(1) ofthe Taiwanese Patent Act), this does not necessarily 
mean that every parallel import will be automatically disallowed. Indeed, pursuant to 
Articles 57(2) and 125 (“The geographic area in whch  sale can be made ... shall be 
determined based on facts by the court.”) of the Patent Act and Rule 39 of the 
Implementation Regulations: 
“The wording ‘the areas in which sale can be made’ as referred to in the provisions of 
Paragraph 2 of Article 57 and Paragraph 2 of Article 125 of this Act shall be determined by 
the Court on the basis of agreement on the contract, real intention of the parties concerned, 
customary practice in trading, or other objective facts accordingly.”14 
The area in which the right of importation is exhausted is not mandated by law but 
can be agreed upon contractually by private parties, whether locally, regionally or 
globally. ’ 5  
III. COMPULSORY LICENSING 
Compulsory licensing has been for a long time an integral part of the Taiwanese IP 
laws to counter-balance the interests of IP right holders against the public interest. 
While the 1998 Copyright Act reduced the category of compulsory licensing to only 
one, namely the sound recording of a musical work (Article 69 of the Copyright Act), 
the Patent Act, in contrast, expanded the scope of compulsory licensing. According to 
Article 76(1), (2) and (5) of the Patent Act: 
“(1) In order to cope with national emergencies, or to make non-profit-seeking use of a 
patent for enhancement of public welfare, or in the case of an applicant’s failure to reach a 
licensing agreement with the patentee concerned under reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions within a considerable period of time, the Patent Authority may, upon an 
application, grant a right of compulsory licensing to the applicant to put the patented 
invention into practice; provided that such practicing shall be restricted mainly to the 
purpose of satisfying the requirements of the domestic market. However, if the application 
for compulsory licensing of a patent right covers semiconductor technology, such 
application may be allowed’only if the proposed practicing is purposed for a non-profit- 
seeking use contemplated to enhance the public welfare. 
(2) In the absence of the conditions set forth in the preceding Paragraph, the Patent 
Authority still may, upon an application, grant to the applicant a compulsory license to 
practice the patented invention in the event that the patentee has imposed restrictions on 
14 Implementing Regulations of the Patent Act; available at: www.tipo.gov.tw/eng/laws/pater-e.asp). 
15 These provisions can be nicely annotated by Article 16.7(2) of the Singaporeunited States Free Trade 
Agreement; available at: (www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Final-Texts/ 
asset-uploadffde70S-4036.pd6: “Each Party shall provide a cause of action to prevent or redress the procurement 
of a patented pharmaceutical product, without the authorization of the patent owner, by a party who knows or has 
reason to know that such product IS or has been distributed in breach of a contract between the right holder and a 
licensee, regardless ofwhether such breach of a contract occurs in or outside its temtory.” However, footnote 16-10 
preserves for either Party the right to “ h i t  such cause of action to cases where the product has been sold or 
distributed only outside the Party’s temtory before its procurement inside the Party’s temtory”. It remains to be 
seen whether either Party will exercise this right. 
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competition or has committed unfair competition, as confirmed by a judgment gven by a 
court or a disposition made by the Fair Trade Commission of the Executive Yuan. 
(5) The grantee of the compulsory license shall pay to the patentee an appropriate 
compensation. In the case of dispute over the amount of such compensation, the amount 
shall be decided by the Patent Authority.” 
Article 24 of the Integrated Circuit Layout Protection Act also has a compulsory 
licensing provision simdar to that of the Patent Act. However, compulsory licensing was 
never applied with regard to the Copyright Act. This would also be the case with regard 
to the Patent Act except that, in July 2002, a Taiwanese CD-R manufacturer filed with 
the Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office (TIPO) the first application for the 
compulsory licensing of five Taiwanese patents owned by Phhps. The applicant was a 
patent licensee of Philips with the royalty arrangement of whichever is the higher: 3 per 
cent of the net sales price or Y 10 for each CD-R &sk. With the freefd of the price of 
CD-R disks, dropping from US$5 per disk in 1997 to US$0.19 in 2003, Phihps insisted 
on charging Y 10 per CD-R and refused to renegotiate on the percentage base proposed 
by the applicant. The TIPO set up a committee with external members to examine the 
application and came to a decision two years later (in 2004), granting the applicant use 
of the five patents at issue to satisfy the need of the domestic market up until their expiry 
dates (between 26 January 2007 and 19 December 2009).16 
On the whole, the reasoning of the TIPO is comprehensive, balanced and, 
therefore, convincing. First of all, it said that the fact that the applicant has used the 
patents at issue before filing the application does not in itself invalidate his eligibility to 
be an applicant under Article 76(1) of the Patent Act. In other words, an applicant does 
not have to wait until the grant of a compulsory license, a process that can take very 
long to conclude, to use the patents. 
Secondly, the term “prior to such use” employed by Article 31(b) of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPS 
Agreement)17-a term absent from Article 76(1) of the Taiwanese Patent Act-only 
refers to “other use without the authorization of the right holder” in general and does 
not mean any use or the particular “use of the patents at issue”. According to the TIPO, 
Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement requires that the applicant has, prior to the 
compulsory licensing, negotiated with the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions 
and failed to reach an agreement: 
“The purpose of compulsory licensing is neither to sanction those who have used patents in 
16 Tze-Fa No. 093185005-0 of the T i p 0  (25 July 2004). Philips fded with the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
an appeal against this decision. As of the date ofpublication of this article, the appeal is still pending. 
‘7 The title of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement reads: “Other Use Without Authorization of the Right 
Holder”. TRIPS Article 31 (b) stipulates: “Where the law of a Member allows for other us-ther than that allowed 
under Article 30, as explained by a footnote-of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the 
right holder, including use by the government or third parties authonzed by the government, the following 
provisions shall be respected . . . (b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has 
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable terms and conditioiis and that such efforts 
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time ...” 
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question prior to negotiating a licensing agreement, nor to deprive them of the standing to 
apply for compulsory licensing . . . Against those who have used patents in question prior to 
negotiating a licensing agreement, the patentee may exercise his right in accordance with 
the Patent Act, thus rendering it unnecessary to deprive them (of the right) to seek a lawful 
use of the patent right via filing an application for compulsory licensing.” 
Thrdly, “reasonable commercial terms and conditions” is an uncertain legal concept 
and defies any fixed definition, not to mention the fact that commercial terms and 
conditions are far-reaching in scope, including the extent, area and time period of 
licensing, the profitability of technology, the renown of the technical brand, 
competition, etc. Therefore, in order to determine the so-called reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions, one shall consider the term of the patents, their market prospect 
and the social and public welfare as a whole and come to the terms and conditions that 
the applicant for compulsory licensing can afford and practically pay. Talung into 
consideration the text and reasoning of the legal provision, its legislative purpose and the 
global operation of the technology concerned, to solve this CD-R royalty controversy, 
commercial terms and conditions considered by an objective third party to not be 
bluntly violating the circumstances in the relevant technology market, and from the 
standpoint of the parties of the contract to be subject to the possibility of further 
negotiation, are reasonable. The TFTC found Philips’ insistence on chargmg 9E 10 for 
each CD-R disk and its refusal to grant the licensee a chance to negotiate to be an abuse 
of monopoly power. Furthemiore, the United States International Trade Commission 
(USITC) found the fixed royalty to be arbitrary and therefore anti-competitive, 
rendering Philips’ patents in the United States unenforceable.18 In addition, the Industry 
Bureau of the Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs was of the opinion that royalties 
in the electronics industry are mostly between 2 and 15 per cent and that the current 
royalty for CD-Rs is indeed high. These three findings suggest that there is room for 
reasonable discussion concerning the method of calculating the royalty set by Philips. 
Consequently, the proposal by the applicant to further negotiate the basis of calculating 
according to a specific percentage (2-5 per cent) of the set sales price can hardly be 
dismissed as unreasonable commercial terms and conditions. 
Fourthly, the term “kithin a considerable period of time” shall be measured by the 
average social concept, and not by the unilateral assertion of the applicant or the person 
against whom the application was filed. The fact that the applicant has fruitlessly tried 
to reach a licensing agreement with Philips for more than a year (from March 2001 to 
April 2002) suffices as a considerable period of time. 
The “appropriate compensation” is yet to be negotiated between the parties. 
According to Article 76(5) of the Patent Act (equivalent to Article 31(h) of the TRIPS 
Agreement), the right holder shall be paid appropriate compensation in case of 
compulsory licensing. However, the TIPO wisely did not touch upon this issue in the 
Philips case, since the object of the application for compulsory licensing is limited to 
‘ 8  For more details see Section V.B. of this article. 
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the granting of such and does not involve the calculation of compensation. As of the 
date of publication of this article, Philips and the applicant have not yet reached any 
agreement on the amount of appropriate compensation. Given the agonistic 
relationship between the parties, no agreement should be expected. The hot potato of 
how to determine the appropriate compensation will be passed on to the TIPO. In 
order to make a scientific and objective determination, one might rely on the “efficient 
component-pricing rule” instead of the otherwise commonly used “marginal costs 
pricing rule.” Under the “efficient component-pricing rule”, the direct per unit 
incremental cost plus the opportunity costs will be the price chargeable for the use of 
a bottleneck facility by third parties.I9 
Nevertheless, the idea of incremental and opportunity costs runs afoul of the 
essence of IP, namely, non-rivalry and zero incremental costs. In other words, IP can 
be used by a limitless number of users a t  the same time and without any incremental 
costs. Therefore, the adequate remuneration can only be decided by the economic 
value of the patent in question. A proxy for this will be the average or normal royalty 
charged or paid in the specific industry.20 In the Philips case, 3 per cent of the net sales 
price can be used as a practical benchmark, simply because it was one of the two 
methods of calculating royalty agreed by Philips. Furthermore, in order to be in line 
with Article 31 (k) of the TRIPS Agreement, which allows the consideration of the need 
to correct anti-competitive practices when determining the amount of remuneration 
in anti-competitive cases, the compensation may be a t  a lower level than the average 
or normal royalty.21 Again, taking the Philips case as an example, this means less than 
3 per cent of the net sales price. 
Compulsory licensing is certainly a double-edged sword; while it prods patentees 
into licensing negotiation, firms hit by it “may decide not to make future technology 
available” in the country which imposed compulsory licensing in the first place.Z2 
However, looking at it as a purely legal issue, IP offices and even governments should 
not worry too much about extra-legal pressure and be afraid to use compulsory licensing 
as “one item in an arsenal of tools that may be used to promote national systems of 
innovation”.*3 
IV. ISSUANCE OF WARNING LETTERS 
It was common in Taiwan for IP right holders to issue warning letters to the 
potential trading partners of the alleged infringers of their rights to prevent the spread 
‘ 9  William J. Baumol and J. Gregory Sidak, T h e  Pricing .f Inputs Sold to Competitors, Yale Journal on 
20 Daniel Gervais, T h e  TRIPS Agreenienf-Drafting Hisrory and Analysis, 2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
21 Id. 
22 Jerome H. Reichman and Cathenne Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing .f Patented Inventions, 2003, at 
2 )  Ibid., at p. 7. 
Regulation, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1994, at p. 178. 
London, 2003, at p. 252. 
pp. 5-6; available at: (www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/iprs/CS-reichman-hasenza~.pd~. 
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of the infringing goods. This practice has been proven to be highly effective, since 
most recipients would rather avoid trouble and accept the asserted infringement at 
face value. With no domestic judicial precedents and no knowledge of comparable 
foreign experiences,24 the TFTC has, out of its own creativity, conceived and 
promulgated the “Guidelines on the Reviewing of Cases Involving Enterprises 
Issuing Warning Letters for Infringement on Copyright, Trademark and Patent 
Rights” (hereinafter, Guidelines on Warning Letters) .25 According to Point 3 of the 
Guidelines, the issuance of warning letters is per se proper conduct to exercise one’s 
right accorded by the Copyright, Trademark, and Patent Acts after the completion of 
one of the following procedures: 
- a determination by a court of first instance confirming that inhngement of a 
copyright, trademark or patent right has been secured; or 
an expert opinion confirming the infringement has been secured from an 
institution jointly appointed by the Judicial Yuan and the Executive Yuan, in 
addition to the manufacturer, importer or agent who may have committed the 
infringement being duly notified by the right holders in advance to cease the 
infringement. 
- 
In cases where due diligence of care has been taken or in situations where 
notification is objectively impossible, the aforementioned notification requirement can 
be waived. 
However, according to Point 4 of the Guidelines on Warning Letters, the issuance 
of warning letters after the completion of one of the following procedures is proper 
conduct for exercising one’s right accorded by the Copyright, Trademark and Patent 
Acts, provided, however, that Points 6 to 9 of the Guidelines have not been violated: 
- an expert opinion confirming the infringement has been secured from an 
institution which was not jointly appointed by the Judicial Yuan and the 
Executive Yuan; and the manufacturer, importer or agent who may have 
committed the inftingement has been notified by the right holders in advance 
to cease the infringement; or 
the specific contents and scope of the copyright, trademark or patent in 
question and the concrete infringmg activity have been included in the 
warning letter so that the receiving party can make a reasonable judgment, in 
addition to the manufacturer, importer or agent that may have committed the 
*’ For example, the German courts are very strict about the issuance of warning letters addressed to third 
parties (Drittvenvarnung), because they constitute an especially dangerous instrument. The courts differentiate IP 
rights that are subject to close examination by IP offices from those which are not, distinguish warning letters 
addressed to manufacturers from those to customers and then impose different degrees of care on the issuers. See 
AdolfBaumbach and Wolfgang Hefermehl, UwG, 22.Aufl., C.H. Beck, Munich, 2001, § 14 Rdnr 12a and 12b. 
*5 Fair Trade Commission Guidelines on the Reviewing of Cases Involving Enterprises Issuing 
Warning Letters for Infringement on Copyright, Trademark and Patent Rights; available at: 
~www.ftc.gov.tw/2000010129991231789.htm~. 
- 
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inhngement being duly notified by the right holders in advance to cease the 
inhngement. 
In cases where due diligence of care has been taken or notification is objectively 
impossible, the aforementioned notification requirement becomes non-binding. 
Following the procedure under Point 4 of the Guidelines on Warning Letters does 
not exempt the issuance ofwarning letters under Articles 19(1) and (3),26 21 (misleading 
presentations)27 and 22 (trade libel) of the Fair Trade Act if the requirement of the 
respective article has been met. Nor does it exclude the application of Article 24 of the 
Fair Trade Act when: 
- 
- 
- 
no legal copyright, trademark or patent exists; 
the scope of the copyright, trademark or patent has been exaggerated; 
it has been falsely stated or implied that its competitors or in general other 
competitors in the market are illegally infringing its copyright, trademark or 
patent; or 
a deceptive or obviously unfair statement was made, and the trading order is 
likely to be affected.28 
- 
The direct issuance of warning letters without following the procedures provided 
by Points 3 or 4 may violate Article 24 of the Fair Trade Act if the trading order is likely 
to be affected. The Guidelines on Warning Letters have been effectively enforced by 
the TFTC and have reined in the abusive practice ofissuing warning letters. Nonetheless, 
the Guidelines on Warning Letters can be further improved by requiring that: 
- the entire court decision or the expert opinion be attached to the warning 
letter to facilitate the recipient’s makmg a reasonable judgment about the 
alleged infringement; and 
the issuer first have filed suit against the actual infringer before it can carry its 
battle with the infringer over to unrelated third parties.29 
- 
26 Article 19(1) and (3) of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, supra, footnote 4, prescribes: “No enterprise shall 
engage in any of the following acts which is likely to lessen competition or to impede fair competition: 1. causing 
another enterprise to discontinue supply, purchase or other business transactions with a particular enterprise for the 
purpose of injuring such particular enterprise; . . . 3. causing the trading counterpar+) of its competitors to do 
business with itself by coercion, inducement with interest, or other improper means; . . .” 
27 Arbcle 21 of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, ibid., prescribes: “1. No enterprise shall make or use false or 
misleading representations or symbol as to price, quantity, quality, content, production process, production date, valid 
period, method of use, purpose of use, place of origin, manufacturer, place of manufacturing, processor, or place of 
processing on goods or in advertisements, or in any other way making known to the public. 2. No enterprise shall sell, 
transport, export or import goods bearing false or misleading representations referred to in the preceding paragraph. 
3. The two preceding paragraphs shall apply mutatis mutandis to the services of an enterprise. 4. Where any advertising 
agency makes or designs any advertisement that it knows or is able to know is misleadmg, it shall be jointly and 
severally liable with the principal ofsuch advertisement for damages arising thereeom. Where any advertising medium 
communicates or publishes any advertisement that it knows or is able to know is likely to mislead the public, it shall 
be jointly and severally liable with the principal of such advertisement for the damages arising therefrom.” 
28 Point 9 of the Guidelines on Warning Letters, supra, footnote 25. 
29 Liu, supra, footnote 9, at pp. 289-290. 
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v. ANTITRUST ISSUES RAISED BY CONTROVERSIAL PATENT-RELATED PRACTICES 
A. DUBIOUS PATENT LICENSING THAT LED TO ADMINISTRATIVE SETTLEMENTS 
In the last 14 years, there have been four cases reported in which the foreign patent 
holders were on the defensive side. 
1. THE INTEL CASE 
In 1993, Intel was accused by Cyrix, Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) and the 
Business Association of the Computer Manufacturing Industry Taipei County of 
violating the Fair Trade Act, while licensing its patents. Allegedly, Intel engaged in the 
following activities: price manipulation; restricting personal computer (PC) 
manufacturers from using central processing units made by its competitors; tying in 
products, compelling Taiwanese manufacturers to sign patent licensing agreements; 
bringing law suits against competitors systematically and continuously; and price 
discrimination. The case ended with an administrative settlement between the TFTC and 
Intel in 1996. However, the content of the settlement was not published by the TFTC.30 
2. THE RCA CASE 
In 1995, the Radio Corporation of America (KcA) was accused of engaging in 
anti-competitive activities, discriminating in royalties, charging improper royalties, 
collecting royalties retroactively and using Section 337 of the U.S. Customs Act as a 
negotiation threat. In 1998, the TFTC and RCA reached an administrative settlement. 
Again, the content of the settlement was not published by the TFTC.31 
3. THE MATRA CASE 
In the 1990s, Matra Transport International secured a contract to provide the 
Taipei Rapid Transit Coporation (TPRC) with its patented VAL system to be deployed 
on one of the city's rapid transit lines. After completing the price negotiation process 
with the TPRC on the maintenance contract for the patented system on 27 March 1996, 
Matra entered into a dispute with the Rapid Transit Bureau of Taipei City with regard 
to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of its contract, which prevented Matra from being 
able to conclude the aforementioned maintenance contract. As a consequence, the 
TPRC was forced to execute the maintenance itself. The TPRC then complained before 
the TFTC that the subcontractors of Matra were constrained by Matra from providing 
service and spare parts and that Matra was misusing its superior market position derived 
from its patents on the automatic control system. 
3" Ibid., at p. 409. 
3' Ibid., at p. 412. 
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Although the TFTC determined that Matra did enjoy a superior position due to its 
patents on the automatic control system, it was not excluded that the Fair Trade Act 
could eventually be applied to Matra’s refusal to provide maintenance service after the 
formal operation of the rapid transit line in question. The TFTC decided to solve the case 
via an administrative settlement, given the lingering factual and legal uncertainties and 
because consumer welfare and security, and thus the public interest, were at stake. In 
1997, Matra and the TFTC reached an administrative settlement which was published in 
the TFTC’S Gazette.32 The essence of the settlement was: 
- Matra may suggest that the TPRC not demand a monetary deposit from Matra 
during the price negotiation process; 
Matra may, within the reasonable boundary, negotiate with the TPRC to 
modify clauses relating to letters of credit as guarantees and to confiscate the 
provided guarantees by way of business arbitration; the negotiation and 
signing of the maintenance contract between Matra and the TPRC is to be 
under the TFTC’S supervision; 
Matra shall not restrain its subcontractors from providing spare parts and 
maintenance service directly to the TPKC; and 
the term of the settlement shall be three months from the date on which 
Matra’s acceptance becomes effective; if no maintenance contract has been 
signed by the expiration of the term, the TFTC will reopen its investigation 
process and take into account whether the reason for the lack of a contract is 
attributable to any party. 
- 
- 
- 
4. THE MICROSOFT CASE 
In 2002, a short-lived student incident called the “anti-anti piracy”, accusing 
Microsoft of misusing its monopolistic power in Taiwan to tie in products and charge 
excessive prices, caught tk attention of the general public and some legislators, who 
filed a complaint against Microsoft Taiwan Company (MSTC) with the TFTC. The TFTC 
looked into the case and settled with Microsoft in 2003. In the published administrative 
settlement, the MSTC and its relevant affiliates agreed, amongst other things,33 to: 
- comply with relevant provisions of the Fair Trade Act with respect to pricing 
and tying in; 
offer ample quantities of supply for individual components of the Office 
Standard (Word, Excel, PowerPoint and Outlook) in the Republic of China 
(ROC, Taiwan) language version; 
- 
32 Gazette of the TFTC, Vol. 7, No. 2, 19Y7, pp. 1 4 .  
33 It has been widely speculated that the TFTC has made MSTC commit to an undertaking to cut its overall 
price level by a certain percentage. 
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- not restrict the freedom of setting resale prices by large account distributors 
(LADS) or large account resellers (LARS); 
promote consumers’ interests by providing, in end-user licence agreements 
with consumers, that ROC courts adjudicating the related disputes may apply 
ROC law and by not requiring licensees to submit to the jurisdiction of courts 
other than ROC courts, and by using ROC language as the governing language; 
promote intra-brand competition by eliminating its “Guidelines Governing 
Product Shipping and Order Placement by LARS and LADS” and by not 
interfering in contractual relations between LARS and users and between LADS 
and Lms.34 
- 
- 
The administrative settlements adopted by the TFTC resemble those of the consent 
decrees of the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (USFTC). However, statistics show that approximately 75-80 per cent of 
all civil cases handled by the Antitrust Division of the USDOJ are settled without 
engaging in litigation,35 whereas administrative settlement remains a sporadc 
phenomenon in TFTC practice.36 
Given the potential of administrative settlements to reach beyond the case-by-case 
and ex post remedy limitation of the competition law, it should be made mandatory in 
the future that a proper public consultation precede the conclusion of any administrative 
settlement.37 Moreover, the supervision of the compliance of administrative settlements 
may pose even greater problems than the ones that they are supposed to solve in the first 
place, the most notable example being the divestiture consent decree between the 
USDOJ and AT&T to break up AT&T in 1984 and its enforcement by Judge Greene.3* 
The consent decree between the USDOJ and Microsoft in 2002 provides a different 
mechanism, by setting up a Technical Committee comprising three members-one 
recommended by USDOJ, one by Microsoft and the third jointly by the two 
recommended members-to monitor the compliance. Arrangements of this kmd may 
manifest benefits in complementing the inefficiency of a competition authority to deal 
with technological issues and in enhancing the credibility of administrative settlements. 
34 The English-language version of  the settlement can be found at the Website of  the TFTC, at: 
35 See Wilbur L. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and Antitrust Laws, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2001, § 14.2. 
36 Along with the aforementioned administrative settlements, there has been only one other settlement in 
1993, in which the IP right of a domestic motorcycle manufacturer, Sanyang, was involved. In that case, Sanyang 
was accused by its competitor of having coerced its satellite manufactories, to whom Sanyang has provided casts, 
not to supply spare parts of a specific senes of 125cc motorcycle to the complainant. The TFTC has settled with 
Sanyang on the following grounds: 1. The niotorcycle industry in Taiwan is export competitive and an important 
model for the so-called center-satellite production system through which Taiwanese manufacturers achieve 
economies of scale. 2. An investigation and sanction might inflict too heavy an impact on that industry. See Liu, 
supra, footnote 9, at p. 412. 
37 The standard procedure of the USFTC requires that the contents of a consent decree contemplated by the 
Commission must be put on public record for 30 days for the public to comment; see 26 CFR, 2005, §§ 2.32-2.34. 
In Peter Huber’s words, “The best of antitrust law degrades into the worst of commission,” because Judge 
Greene “took charge, created a system for granting waivers to the decree quarantine, and then ran that system for 
the next fourteen years”. See Peter Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace, Oxford University Press, Oxford, U.K., 
1997, at p. 98. 
~www.ftc.gov.tw/MSContrac2003.pd5. 
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B. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PATENT LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS 
1. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PATENT LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS FOUND TO VIOLATE THE 
FAIR TRADE ACT 
In 1999, certain Taiwanese CD-R disk manufacturers accused Philips 
Electronics, N.V., the Sony Corporation (Japan), and Taiyo Yuden (Japan) of abusing 
their monopoly power in the CD-R market through patent pooling and collective 
patent Iicensing to demand excessive royalties, of engaging in cartels by bundling 
patents and by licensing in packages, of tying in patents that had already expired and 
obscuring information about the patents to be licensed. The TFTC found that the 
defendants indeed violated several articles of the Fair Trade Act (the Philips I 
Decision).39 The defendants appealed to the Executive Yuan, which was not 
convinced by the determination of market by the TFTC and overruled the Philips I 
Decision, remanding it back to the TFTC. The TFTC reached a Decision on 25 April 
2002 (the Philips 11 Decision) with the same conclusion as the Philips r Decision.40 
Both the Philips I and 11 Decisions are mainly based on the grounds described in the 
following sub-Sections. 
(a). THE DEFENDANTS WERE HORIZONTAL COMPETITORS 
According to the Philips I Decision, the defendants are horizontal competitors in 
the CD-R patent-licensing market. The qualification of a horizontal competition 
relationship is the prerequisite for the application of the cartel regime of the Fair Trade 
The defendants’ assertion that the patents they own are collectively necessary and 
not interchangeable for the production of a certain product, and that the patents 
complement each other, does not affect the determination of a horizontal relationship 
since the defendants admitted that they still offered indwidual licences competitively 
and, in addition, each defendant has its own research and development (R&D) and did 
compete against each other at the initial stages of R&D for CD-R. The Philips 11 
Decision emphasizes that each defendant is potentially capable of developing other 
interchangeable technology that can compete with other defendants and that the patents 
owned by defendants are in fact interchangeable to some extent. 
(b). CARTEL ACTIVITIES 
The Philips I and II Decisions found that the defendants violated Article 14 of the 
3y Decision No. 21 (2001) of the TFTC. 
4n Decision No. 091069 (2002) of the TFTC. This Decision was again appealed to the Executive Yuan, which 
upheld it. I t  was then appealed to the Taipei Administrative High Court, and that appeal is still pending as of the 
date of publication of this article. 
41 According to Article 7(2) of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, supra, footnote 4, the term “concerted action” 
is limited to horizontal concerted action at the same production and/or marketing stage which would affect the 
market function of production, trade in goods, or supply and demand of services. 
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Fair Trade Act by engaging in two cartel activities.42 First, Sony and Taiyo Yuden 
promised Philips that “all the licensing requests on their patents at issue will be 
forwarded to Philips, and no other licensing agreements will be made, except for other 
cross-licensing agreements of a broad coverage”. Second, Philips, in its response to the 
complainants, stated: “Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden have all agreed that there is only 
one way of calculating royalty, namely 3% of the net sales price and at least 10 Japanese 
Yen for each CD-R disk.”43 Such cartel activities were sufficient to affect the market 
function of producing and trading products or providing services because the defendants 
owned all the patents necessary for the production of CD-R disks and, thus, together 
possessed a worldwide monopoly status. Hence, collective licensing left no room for 
individual licensing. 
(c). MONOPOLY POWER I N  THE CD-R PATENT-LICENSING TECHNOLOGY MARKET 
It was determined that all the important patents for the manufacture of CD-R disks 
were owned by the defendants, and any production and sales of CD-R disks in the 
world must acquire patent licences from the defendants. Therefore, the defendants had 
an overwhelmingly superior position to exclude competition and enjoyed a worldwide 
monopolistic status.44 
(d). ABUSE OF MONOPOLY POWER 
The Phil@ I and 11 Decisions further held that the defendants engaged in 
42 Article 14 ofthe Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, ibid., prohibits in principle cartels, unless they are approved in 
advance by the TFTC: “No enterprise shall have any concerted action; unless the concerted action that meets one 
ofthe following requirements is beneficial to the economy as a whole and in the public interest, and the application 
with the central competent authority for such concerted action has been approved: 
unifying the specifications or models of goods for the purpose of reducing costs, improving quality, 
or increasing efficiency; 
joint research and development on goods or markets for the purpose of upgrading technology, 
improving quality, reducing costs, or increasing efficiency; 
each developing a separate and specialized area for the purpose of rationalizing operations; 
entering into agreements conteming solely the competition in foreign markets for the purpose of 
securing or promoting exports; 
joint acts in regards to the importation of foreign goods for the purpose of strengthening trade; 
joint acts limiting the quantity of production and sales, equipment, or pnces for the purpose of 
meeting the demand in a n  orderly manner, whlle in economic downturn, the market price of 
products is lower than the average production costs so that the enterprises in a particular industry have 
difficulty maintaining their business or encounter a situation of overproduction; or 
7. joint acts for the purpose of improving operational efficiency or strengthening the competitiveness of 
small to medium enterprises. 
After receipt ofthe application referred to in the preceding Article, the Central Competent Authority shall 
make a decision of approval or rejection within three months, the period of which may be extended once if 
necessary.” 
1. 
2. 
3.  
4. 
5. 
6. 
43 Decision No. 091069 (2002) of the TFTC. 
44 According to Article 5(1) and (2) of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, supra, footnote 4: “1. The term 
‘monopolistic enterprise’ as used in this Act means any enterprise that faces no competition or has an 
overwhelmingly superior position to enable it to exclude competition in a relevant market. 2. Two or inore 
enterprises shall be deemed monopolistic enterprises if they do not in fact engage in price competition with each 
other and they as a whole have the same status as the enterprise defined in the provisions of the preceding 
paragraph.” 
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monopolistic conduct by acting through a cartel in the CD-R patent-licensing market 
and that they also violated Article 10(2) and (4) of the Fair Trade Act.?j Philips defended 
its royalty scheme as necessary to recover its tremendous R&D investment at the time 
when the licensing agreements were first negotiated. However, the TFTC looked into 
the drastic price drop (US$ 7 for each CD-R in 1996, and less than US$ 0.5 in 2000) 
and the sixty-fold growth in volume worldwide (from 182 million CD-Rs in 1997 to 
3.6 billion CD-Rs in 2000). It was concluded that the maintenance of such a royalty 
scheme would reap for the defendants royalties of twenty to sixty times more in 2000 
than the expected amount. O n  the other hand, defendants refused to lower their royalty 
scheme to match market demand. Hence, the defendants were found guilty of abusing 
of their monopoly market power through charging royalties far in excess of those 
expected by the licensors. 
(e ) .  OTHER EXPLOITATIVE ABVSE OF MONOPOLY POWER 
Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden were also found to be elusive about important 
trading information, such as the contents, scope and terms of patents and the number of 
patents they individually owned. Moreover, the TFTC found the defendants’ demand 
that licensees withdraw their invalidity applications against defendants’ patents as a 
precondition for concluding the licensing contracts was an improper exercise of patent 
rights. All of these acts amounted to a so-called exploitative abuse of monopoly power 
and therefore violated Article lO(4) of the Fair Trade Act. Thus, Philips, Sony and Taiyo 
Yuden were sanctioned by the TFTC to pay fines of N T $ 8  million, N T $ 4  million and 
NT$ 2 million, respectively. 
The defendants appealed the Philips rI Decision to the Executive Yuan but were 
rebuffed. They then took their case to the Administrative High Court of Taipei, which, 
at the date of publication of this article, has not yet rendered its decision.46 
2. ANTI-COMPETITIVE PATENT LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS FOUND TO BE PATEN? 
MISUSE UNDER THE 6 . S .  PATENT ACT 
In 2002, Philips (Complainant) resorted to the USITC and filed with it an 
application to use Section 337 of the U.S. Customs Act to stop the importation of 
CD-R disks made by two Taiwanese CD-R manufacturers who had not settled with it 
(Respondents) on the charge of infringing its U.S. patents. The Respondents raised a 
defense that the patents at issue were unenforceable because the Complainant had 
engaged in patent misuse involving the creation of an unlawful patent pool and the use 
45 Article lO(2) and (4) of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, ibid., reads: “No rnonopohstic enterprise shall: ... 
2. improperly set, maintain or change the price for goods or the remuneration for services; . . . or 4. otherwise abuse 
its market power.” 
46 Above the Administrative High Court ofTaipei sits the Administrative Supreme Court, which has the final 
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of its monopoly power to control the U.S. CD-R and CD-RW disk markets. Thus, at 
issue was the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 271(d)(5), which was introduced into the U S .  
Patent Act in 1988 by the Patent Misuse Reform Act. 35 U.S.C. 271(d)(5)(d) reads : 
“(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory 
infiingement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension 
of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: 
... 
(5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on 
the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, 
unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant 
market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is condtioned.” 
O n  24 October 2003, Administrative Law Judge Sidney Hams of the USITC 
reached an Initial Determination (ID) of patent misuse rendering the patents 
unenforceable, not only by the rule of reason test but also by the per se test.47 The ID 
was upheld by the USITC. 
(a). THE PHILIPS CD-R AND CD-RW PATENT POOLS 
In the early 1990s, Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden formed a patent pool of the 
CD-R patents that each owned in order to license manufacturers to produce and sell 
Orange Book (standard specifications)-compliant CD-R disks. Philips and Sony formed 
a s i d a r  patent pool along with Ricoh for Orange Book-compliant CD-RWs. With 
time, the Phibps CD-R and CD-RW patents pools changed fiom a single package into 
a series of packages of so-called “essential” and “non-essential” patents, the former of 
which must be licensed but the latter of which may be licensed in addition without 
paying any additional royalty fee. Philips’ CD-RW packages are divided into s i d a r  
arrangements.48 
(b). PER SE ANALYSIS 
According to the ID, 35 U.S.C. 271(d)(5) does not preclude a per se approach to 
examining an antitrust-based patent misuse defense, it just disfavours the presumption 
that patent ownership equates with the element of market power. The ID also 
determined that Philips has no market power in the worldwide product market for 
CD-R/RW (combined with its licensor-partners, it has only 8.8 per cent of world 
manufacturing output and 13 per cent of the worldwide sales of CD-Rs, and 2 per cent 
and 10 per cent of CD-RWs worldwide output and sales in 2002), but Philips and its 
licensor-partners do have the market power of an absolute monopoly in the licensing 
market, because there can be no CD-R or CD-RW manufacturing without a licence 
fi-om Phihps and because Phdips was able to maintain the royalty rates (now representing 
47 USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-474; available on the Website of the USITC, at: cwww.usitc.gov>. 
48 Ibid., at pp. 14G141. 
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50-70 per cent of today’s average net sales price and an unlsclosed multiple49 of those 
of inlvidual rates worked out between Philips and its Taiwanese licensees after the 
TFTC’s decisions) above competitive levels for a significant period of time. 
The ID was of the opinion that the royalty rates hnction to fix prices above the 
competitive level, entahng price discrimination both in nature-because the “all-or- 
nothing” patent licensing scheme with only a one-rate royalty is a classic example of 
economic discrimination, totally unrelated to factors normally affecting the royalty rates 
calculation-and in application-because the royalty for the products sold by the 
licensees to the cross-licensees of Philips was exempted. 
To sum up, the: 
“ ... foregoing restraints on the U.S. market for unique CD-R/RW patented technology rises 
to the level of a per se antitrust violation because they are sure to ‘threaten the proper 
operation of our predominantly free-market economy’ in a way that ‘would always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition’ in such technology.”50 
(c). “RULE OF REASON” ANALYSIS 
(i). Scope ofthe patent grant 
The practice of pooling “essential” with “non-essential” patents under a licence 
agreement is well-recognized under U.S. antitrust laws to constitute an extension beyond 
the statutory right to exclude. When the non-essential patents are added to the pools on 
the ground that they are “necessary as a practical matter”, the statutory monopolies of the 
essential patents are impermissibly expanded. Consequently, Philips’ bundling of 
“essential” with “non-essential” patents in its CD-R and CD-RW patent pooling 
licence agreements, as well as its bundhng of “technically essential” patents with patents 
that are improperly deemed to be “necessary as a practical matter”, exceed the scope of 
its right to exclude under its patents and, therefore, must be further analyzed under the 
“rule of reason” to balance the pro- and anti-competitive effects of this practice. 
(ii). Application of “essentiality” standards to patents in the pools 
The decision whether a patent is to be included in the pools was assigned to 
Dr Kenneth Rubenstein, who considers himself an “independent evaluator”. In 
deciding whether a patent is “essential”, Dr Rubenstein breaks his analysis into two 
parts. A patent is “technically essential” when “at least one claim of the patent covers 
a portion” of the Orange Book and is “essential as a practical matter” when “at least 
one claim has no commercially reasonable alternative for implementing a portion of 
the CD-R Standard”. 
49 The UslTC intentionally deleted the sales- and business-related information to protect the parties’ trade 
5” USITC Investigation No. 337-TA-474, supra, footnote 47, at pp. 175-182. 
secrets. 
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The ID found that Dr Rubenstein’s method confuses “technical compliance” with 
infringement of a “technically essential” patent in the pool and is virtually arbitrary. 
Furthermore, it is contrary to the USDOJ’S definition of patents that are “essential as a 
practical matter” in its business review letters related to the CD-R industry-namely, 
only patents that are “essential as a practical matter: patents for which there are no 
substitutes for the purpose of compliance with the Standard Specifications”-and 
suppresses emerging technologies by gradually extending the reach of the pools beyond 
the Orange Book. 
The ID concluded that, on balance, the anti-competitive effect on the alternative 
technologies outweighs the pro-competitive effect of creating a convenient, broad 
package of patents for manufacturers to license. In addition, several non-essential 
patents were found to be included in the pools. Moreover, the ID took into account 
the unreasonable nature of the royalty rate that is in and of itself necessarily arbitrary 
and unilaterally imposed, an impracticable royalty floor that bore no economically 
driven rhyme or reason. On balance, patent pools constitute patent misuse because 
they unreasonably restrain trade in the U.S. market for licensing patented CD-R/RW 
technology.51 
VI. TFTC GUIDELINES ON THE REVIEW OF PATENT AND KNOW-HOW LICENSING 
AGREEMENTS 
Based upon the experience drawn from the administrative settlements with foreign 
patent holders, taking into account the current industrial development of Taiwan, and 
with reference to the U.S., European and Japanese rules on technology licensing, the 
TFTC promulgated the “Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements” on 
20 January 2001.52 Up until now, these Guidelines have not been applied by the TFTC 
or the courts. Hence, their actual effects remain to be seen. The Guidelines cover patent 
and know-how licences (Point 2(2) of the Guidelines on Technology Licensing 
Arrangements). Following the. U.S. path, the Guidelines do not presume that the 
licensor possesses market power simply because he owns a patent or know-how (Point 3 
of the Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements). 
A. ANALYTICAL STEPS 
Point 4 of the Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements delineates the 
analytical steps that the TFTC will follow to determine the legality of the technology 
licensing arrangements in question. 
51 Ibid., at pp. 182-193 and 213-220. 
52 Fair Trade Commission, Guidelines on Technology Licensing Anangements; available at: 
www.ftc .gov.tw/ 10000 101 2999 123 1 530. ht~nj. 
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Paragraph 1 of Point  4 of the Guidelines provides that the  Patent Act does not  
exclude the application of the Fair Trade Act: 
“(1) In reviewing technology licensing arrangement cases, the Commission will first 
examine the licensing arrangements with respect to Article 45 of the Law [the Fair 
Trade Act]. An arrangement, which is in form a proper conduct in connection with 
the exercise of rights under the Patent Act or other relevant laws, but in substance 
oversteps the scope of proper exercise of rights under such laws and contravenes their 
legislative purpose of protecting invention and innovation, shall be reviewed under the 
Law [the Fair Trade Act] and its Rules.” 
Paragraph 2 of Point  4 of the Guidelines provides how the TFTC will determine 
the impact of technology licensing agreements on relevant markets: 
“(2) In reviewing technology licensing agreements, the Commission [the TFTC] will not be 
bound by the form or wording of such arrangements, but will emphasize on possible or 
actual restraint of competition or unfair competition created by such arrangements in the 
following relevant markets: 
i. ‘Goods markets’ to which the goods manufactured or provided through use of the 
licensed technology belong. 
‘Technology markets’ defined by technology that is substitutable with the licensed 
technology.[531 
‘Innovation markets’ in which research and development of relevant goods may 
take place.” 
ii. 
... in. 
Paragraph 3 of Point  4 of the Guidelines provides the factors t o  be considered by 
the TFTC when reviewing technology licensing agreements: 
“(3) In reviewing technology licensing arrangements, in addition to the reasonableness of the 
provisions of such arrangements, the Commission shall consider the following factors: 
The market power of the licensor with regard to the licensed technology. 
The market position of the parties to the arrangement in a relevant market and the 
status of that market. 
The degree of influence to which the licensing arrangement will increase 
opportunities for utilization of the technology or exclude competition. 
The degree of difficulty of access to the relevant market. 
The length of the term of limitations under the licensing arrangement. 
International or industry precedents applicable to the relevant market for the 
licensed technology.” 
i. 
ii. 
... in. 
iv. 
v. 
vi. 
53 In the Philips II  case, the TFTC elaborated on the factors to be considered when defining a “technology 
market”: 1. other IP or technology that produces the same class of products or products deemed by consumers to 
be of the same function; 2. other IP or technology that produces competing products; and 3.  the economic effect 
of the technology at issue (capable of producing products deemed by consumen to be substitutable), in case the 
relevant information is hard to acquire; see Decision No. 091069 (2002) of the TFTC. 
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B . WHITE CLAUSES 
The Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements contain so-called 
“white”, “black” and “gray” clauses and  give examples thereof, illustratively but  not  
exhaustively. Point  5 of the Guidelines prescribes that the  following kinds of 
technology licensing arrangement stipulations do not  intrinsically violate the provisions 
of the Act on restraint of competition or unfair competition, with the  exception of those 
improper  matters t o  be found after being reviewed according t o  Points 3 and 4: 
Limitations clauses that restrict the scope of use by the licensee to manufacture, use, or 
sell. 
Restrictions on the terms of a licensing arrangement that fall within the term ofvalidity 
of the patent itself. Restrictions on the terms of a licensing arrangement prior to public 
dnclosure of know-how, which, through no circumstance imputable to the licensor, 
has been disclosed and lost its status as a trade secret. 
Stipulations that, for ease of calculation, fees for licensed technology that is part of a 
manufacturing process or that subsists in component parts are to be calculated on the 
basis of the quantity of finished goods manufactured or sold that employ the licensed 
technology, or the quantity of raw materials or component parts used that employ the 
licensed technology or the number of times such materials or parts are used in the 
manufacturing process. 
Stipulations that the licensee shall continue to pay fees after expiration of the patent term 
for use already made of the licensed technology, where the fees for use of a licensed 
patent are paid in installments or on a post-paid [running royalty] basis. Stipulations that 
in the event of public disclosure of the know-how and loss of its status as a trade secret 
through no circumstance imputable to the licensor, the licensee must continue to pay 
the agreed fees by a certain period and method through the fi-ee will of the parties to the 
arrangement until the expiration or termination of the arrangement. 
Stipulations that the licensee shall grant non-exclusive license to the licensor with 
respect to any improvements in or new applications of the licensed technology. 
Stipulations that the licensee shall, to the best of its ability, manufacture and sell goods 
using the licensed technology. 
Stipulations that, during the licensing period or after the expiration of the term of the 
licensing arrangement, impose on the licensee the obligation to maintain the secrecy 
of any know-how that retains the status of a trade secret. 
Clauses that, in order to guarantee the licensor a minimum amount of revenue from 
licensing fees, require the licensee to produce a minimum volumes of goods employing 
the licensed technology, to employ the licensed technology a minimum number of 
times in the manufacturing process, or to sell a minimum quantity of goods 
manufactured with the licensed technology. 
Requirements that the licensee shall maintain a certain level of quality with respect to 
the goods, raw materials, or component parts of the goods that employ the licensed 
technology insofar as is necessary to ensure effective utilization of the licensed 
technology and maintain a certain level of quality in the licensed goods. 
(10) Stipulations that the licensee may not transfer or sublicense the licensed technology, 
except where otherwise agreed by the parties to the licensing arrangement. 
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(1 1) Stipulations that the licensee may not continue to use the licensed technology after the 
expiration of the term of the licensing arrangement insofar as the licensed patent 
remains valid or the licensed know-how remains a trade secret.” 
c. BLACK CLAUSES 
Point 6 of the  Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements lists some 
provisions as per se illegal: 
“(1) Arrangements between parties to a licensing arrangement who are in a competitive 
relationship, in which, through contract, agreement, or other form of mutual 
understanding, they jointly determine the price of the goods employing the licensed 
technology, or restrict quantities of goods, trading partners, trading regons or areas of 
research and development, thus, mutually restricting each other’s business activities in 
a manner sufficient to influence the functions of the relevant market in violation of 
Article 14 of the Law [the Fair Trade Act]. 
(2) Licensing arrangement content that involves any of the circumstances listed as the 
following acts which is likely to restrict competition or to impede fair competition in 
relevant markets violates Article 19(6) of the Law [the Fair Trade Act][541: 
Restrictions on competitive activities by the parties to the arrangement or their 
related enterprises with respect to research and development, manufacture, use, or 
sale of competing goods. 
Restrictions on a party to the licensing arrangement with respect to marketing 
methods, scope of use of the licensed technology, or trading counterparts, in order 
to achieve the goal of market segmentation. 
Mandatory requirements that the licensee purchase, accept, or use other patents or 
know-how not needed by the licensee. 
Mandatory requirements that the licensee assign back exclusively to the licensor 
any improvements to the licensed patent or know-how. 
Restrictions on the licensee’s free use of the technology in question or required 
payment of fees or royalties after extinction of the patent or after the know-how 
has been publicly disclosed through no circumstance imputable to the licensor. 
Restrictions on the licensee’s manufacture, use, or sale of competing goods or 
utilization of competing technology after the expiration of the term of the 
licensing arrangement. 
Restrictions on the price at  which the licensee may sell goods manufactured or 
produced with the licensed technology to a third party. 
Restrictions on the licensee’s ability to challenge the validity of the licensed 
technology. 
i. 
ii. 
... 
111. 
iv. 
v. 
vi. 
vii. 
viii. 
j4 Article lY(6) of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, supra, footnote 4, reads: “No enterpnse shall have any of the 
following acts which ic likely to lessen competition or to impede fair competition: ... 6. limiting its trading 
counterparts’ business activity improperly by means of the requirements of business engagement.” Article 25(1) of 
the Enforcement Rules ofthe Fair Trade Act, available at: ~www.ftc.gov.tw/200001012Y9901011375.htm~, further 
defines the “hmiting” as “tying arrangements, exclusive dealing, restrictions on temtory, customem or use, and 
other restrictions on business activities.” 
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ix. Refusal by the licensor to provide the licensee with information on the content, 
scope, or valid term of a patent. 
(3)  When a party to a licensing arrangement is a monopolistic enterprise, the issue of 
whether any of the matters above-listed violates Article 10 of the Law [the Fair Trade 
Act] shall be determined with reference to the contexts of individual case.” 
D. GRAY CLAUSES 
Point 7 of the Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements dustrates some 
“gray” clauses whose legality may be questioned: 
“( 1) Technology licensing arrangement content that is likely to restrain competition or 
impede fair competition in relevant markets may violate Article 19(6)(vi) of the Law [the 
Fair Trade Act]. Examples include: 
Restrictions involving distinctions between regons in which the licensing is 
applicable within the territory of Taiwan during the valid term of a patent. 
Likewise, regonal restrictions on the use of know-how before the know-how is 
publicly disclosed or loses its status as a trade secret through no circumstance 
imputable to the licensor; 
Restrictions on the scope of sales or the trading counterparts of the licensee, where 
the restrictions are unrelated to the areas of application [of the licensed 
technology]. Restrictions on the areas or scope of applications in which the 
licensee may practice the licensed technology; 
Ceilings restricting the quantity of goods that may be manufactured or sold by the 
licensee, or the number of times the know-how or patented technology may be 
used; 
Requirements that the licensee must sell goods through the licensor or a person 
designated by the licensor; 
Requirements that the licensee pay licensing fees based on the quantity of a 
particular type of good manufactured or sold irrespective of whether the licensee 
used the licensed technology. 
i. 
ii. 
... 
111. 
iv. 
v. 
(2) Article 19(l)(ii) or (6)(vi) of the Law may be violated by requirements that the licensee 
purchase raw materials or coniponent parts from the licensor or a person designated by 
the licensor, where such requirements are unrelated to reasonable and necessary efforts 
to assure effective utilization of the licensed technology, to maintain the reputation of a 
trademark associated with the licensed technology or to maintain the secrecy of the 
know-how involved, and where such requirements are likely to restrain competition or 
impede fair competition in relevant markets. 
(3) Article 19(2)(ii) of the Act may be violated by licensing arrangements that, without 
justification, give discriminatory treatment to licensees with regard to the terms of the 
arrangement or licensing fees, where such discriminatory treatment would be likely to 
restrain competition or impede fair competition in relevant markets.”55 
55 Article 19(1) and (2) of the Taiwanese Fair Trade Act, supra, footnote 4, reads: “No enterprise shall have 
any of the following acts which is likely to lessen conipetition or to impede fair competition: 1. causing another 
enterprise to discontinue supply, purchase or other business transactions with a particular enterprise for the purpose 
of injuring such particular enterpnse; 2. treating another enterprise discrimtnatively without justification; ._.” 
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E. EVALUATION OF THE GUIDELINES 
On balance, the Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements are very 
detailed and encompassing in content, on the one hand, but silent on the reasoning 
behind the clauses, on the other, which makes it more categorical and micro-managing 
than understandable and persuasive. Unfortunately, the Guidelines did not entirely 
incorporate the judgments of Articles 60, 108 and 129 of the Patent Act, which declare 
void patent assignment and licensing agreements that contain one of the following 
clauses and lead to unfair competition: 
“(1) To prohibit or restrict the assignee from using any specific article or process not 
furnished by the assignor or licensor; or 
(2) To require that the assignee purchase products or raw materials of the assignor which is 
not under patent protection.”56 
The Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements will be in much better 
shape if they follow the EU Regulation No. 772/2004 on the application ofArticle 81 (3) 
of the Treaty to categories of technology transfer agreements of 27 April 2004, by 
moving away from listing “white” and “gray” clauses, focusing only on hardcore 
restrictions and takmg a more economics-based approach which differentiates 
agreements between competitors from agreements between non-competitors, exempts 
clauses below a certain level of market power and takes both industrial developments 
and the nature of the technology at issue into consideration. 
One of the features of the international competitiveness of Taiwanese industry is 
its world-scale manufacturing capacity and cost-effectiveness in driving down prices. 
Parallel to this is the amazing rate of the drop in prices in the information industry.57 An 
appropriate consideration of these Characteristics would lead the Guidelines on 
Technology Licensing Arrangements to blacklist any scheme that maintains a minimum 
royalty floor regardless of a sharp price decline. 
The emerging patent pool-related antitrust issue in Taiwan merits treatment by 
the Guidelines on Technology Licensing Arrangements, which they neglected to do. 
In the future, the Guidelines could render proper treatment of patent pools by 
highlighting, first, their obvious pro-competitive effects, such as reducing transaction 
and litigation costs, clearing blocking patents and facilitating the rapid development of 
technology and, secondly, some of the anti-competitive effects which are inherent to 
patent pools, such as, for example, being a disguised vehicle for cartels, being over- 
inclusive by including unessential or even unrelated or expired patents into patent 
56 Article 60 of the Patent Act, supra, footnote 1. 
57 According to Gerald Brock, The Second Information Reoolution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2003, at p. 67, the 1950 Whirlwind memory cost was US$ 46,000 per kilobyte, while by 2001 the 
price of a memory had dropped to US$ 00.001 per kilobyte, a price reduction factor of 46 million. 
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pools58 and being exclusionary by having a closed membership. Furthermore, the 
Guidelines should follow the suggestion that open membership and non-exclusive 
licensing among pool members be taken as an important mechanism to prevent the 
anti-competitive effects of patent p0oling.5~ 
VII. THE ADOPTION OF THE ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE BY THE TFTC 
The TFTC’S 4C Guidelines give the 4C industries some guidelines on how to judge 
and consequently adapt their activities to comport with the Fair Trade Act. In giving 
some illustrative examples of misuse of superior market power, the 4C Guidelines list 
“abuse with an essential facility” first. Inter alia, the TFTC refers specifically to the MCI 
case60 and defines essential facilities as those fulfilling the following criteria: 
- controlled by a monopolist; 
- 
- 
competitors are unable to duplicate in an economical and reasonable way; 
competitors are unable to compete with the owner of the facility if denied the 
use of the facility; and 
- the owner of the facility is able to provide competitors with the facility.6* 
The 4C Guidelines further reason that, due to the fact that competitors will not be 
able to compete with the owner of the essential facility if denied the use of the essential 
facility and that the controller of the essential facility acquires therefore the ability to 
obstruct or exclude competitors, the 4C industries, especially, are very likely to exclude 
competitors from competition through the use of essential facilities. Therefore, if 
monopolies in the 4C industries improperly refuse to provide, cease to provide or 
discriminatorily provide competitors with the use of the essential facility, and thus leads 
to constraint of competition or impediment of fair competition, then they bear the 
danger of violating Article 10 of the Fair Trade Act. Although the Explanations of the 
4C Guidelines do not mention IY as a form of essential facility and does not generalize, 
it is nonetheless possible that the TFTC might conceive of some bottleneck IP as essential 
facilities in the 4C industries or even in general. 
58 In the Philips II case, the TFTC expressed its opinion on patent pools: “Patent pools are themselves 
indicputable, what is dispiitablc is that the partics fix prices, segment markets or limit the items that they can freely 
develop via collective licensing, thus affecting the functioning of the market competition mechanism. The 
defendants have patents from different countries, and Sony does not have patents necessary for the manufacture of 
CD-Rs in Taiwan or Europe. The collective licensing has expanded itc patent scopec improperly, excluded other 
competitors from entering and violated the prohibition of concerted activities by the Act.” Decision No. 091069 
(2002) of the TFTC. It clearly distances itself from the general assertion by one scholar that “if a patent pool uses its 
collective market power to have a greater effect on competition, then this exceeds the protection granted by the 
patent law and Taiwan’s Fair Trade Law should apply”; see Min-Yan Shieh, A Discussion ofthe Relationship Between 
the Patent Law and the Fair Trade Law in Taiwan with a Review ofthe Philips CD-R Decisions, in Tzong-Leh Hwang and 
ChiYuan Chen (eds.), T h e  Future Development of Competition Framework, Kluwer Law International, 2004, at p. 175. 
5y Robert P. Merges, Itistifu/ii)nsfor Intellerfual Properfy Transactions: The  Casefor PGatent Pools, in Rochelle Dreyfuss, 
Diane L. Zimmermann and Harry First (eds.), Expanding the Boundaries o f  Intellectual Property, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, U.K., 2001, at p. 164. 
61’ Mcr Communications Corp. v .  ATErT, 708 F.2d, 1081, 1132 (7th Circuit, 1983). 
61 Point 5.1 of the 4C Guidelines, supra, footnote 7. 
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As a matter of first principle, it needs to be pointed out that the essential facility 
doctrine is not yet a settled law in the United States because for the following reasons. 
Firstly, the Supreme Court has neither explicitly embraced nor rejected it, and did 
expressly refuse to rest its ruling on the essential facility doctrine in Aspen Skiing (472 
U.S. 585(1985)). Secondly, although the essential facility doctrine continues to find 
recognition (for example, Trinko v .  Bell Atlantic Coy., 294 F.3d 307 (2d Cir.), the 
number of successful invocations of the doctrine after the MCI case are few.6z Moreover, 
among those courts that endorsed the essential facility doctrine, the tendency has been 
to interpret it narrowly and not to extend it beyond situations where the defendant’s 
control of the facility enabled it to eliminate competition in the downstream market.63 
Thirdly, heavyweight writers are very critical of this principle. Posner argues that 
simple, unconditional refusal to deal by dominant firms should never be deemed a 
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.64 Areeda and Hovenkamp find it inconsistent 
with the purpose of antitrust laws, both harmful and unnecessary, and conclude that it 
should be abandoned.65 
Clearly, the 4C Guidelines are misguided in their reliance on the essential facility 
doctrine, which is not yet established in the United States, to generally conclude that if 
monopolies in the 4C industries improperly refuse to provide, cease to provide or 
discriminatorily provide competitors with the use of the essential facility, and that leads 
to constraint of competition or impediment of fair competition, then they bear the 
danger of violating Article 10 of the Fair Trade Act. Nor does the over-generalization 
of this doctrine by the 4C Guidelines get any support from European competition law, 
which, in Article 82 EC, also prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, similar to the 
Taiwanese Fair Trade Act. As the European Court ofJustice has recently reaffirmed its 
long-held position in the ZMS Health GmbH case (C-418/01, decided on 29 Apri12004), 
which regards as abuse the refusal by an undertaking in a dominant position to allow 
access to a product protected by copyright where that product is indispensable for 
operating on a secondary market: 
“_ . . only where the undertaking which requested the license docs not intend to limit itself 
essentially to duplicating €he goods or services already offered on the secondary market by 
the owner of the copyright, but intends to produce new goods or services not offered by 
the owner ofthe right and for which there is a potential consumer demand.” (paragraph 49) 
I t  is therefore advisable for the TFTC to limit its interpretation of the essential 
facility doctrine to cases where the refusal to license the use of such facility may 
eliminate the competition of a secondary market, be it downstream, upstream or 
adjacent. 
6’ Pierre Larouche, Cornperi~ioii Law arid Replatiotr in European Te/ecoinrnnnicarion~, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
63 Gregory McCurdy, Inteiiecrid Properfy and Cornpetifion: Does fhe Essentini Fadities Doctrine Shed Any New 
64 Richard Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd edition, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001, at pp. 242-244. 
65 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovcnkamp, Aiifitnrst Law, 2nd edition, Aspen Publishers, New York, 2002, 
U.K., 2000, at p. 178. 
Light! E.I.P.R., 2003, p.  472. 
at pp. 171-173. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, what remains decisive for the determination of a proper 
interplay between IP and competition law is not an abstract economic analysis of the IP 
regime as a whole but, rather, the value approach each country needs to take for its own 
interest, namely, whether to be comparatively more pro-competition or more pro-IP 
in order to take its development stages and core competitiveness into consideration. 
This approach may vary over time, as the development of the United States and the 
European Union clearly shows a shift from a weak patent and strong antitrust standing 
in the 1970s to a strong patent and weak antitrust position in the 1990s. Every sovereign 
country needs to make its judgment consciously. 
Taking Taiwan’s strength in IP and world trade as a whole, one will soon realize 
that Taiwan is by far a net importer of IP and plays a key role in the world economy 
only as an original equipment manufacturing center rather than an R&D, branding and 
licensing hub. Thus, in the near future, it serves the Taiwanese national interest best to 
take a slightly pro-competition stance throughout its legislative, administrative and 
judicial branches. Measured by that yardstick, the parallel import regime in Taiwan 
needs to be improved by allowing more choice for consumers and more intra-brand 
competition that truly reflects the goal of the WTO: a globalized world market that is 
beyond any market segregation, whether by IP or not. 
Compulsory licensing of IP (excluding, however, trademarks) is the inherent and 
integral part of IP, given its instrumentalist foundation that seeks to strike a delicate 
balance between public and private interests. The first-ever compulsory licence granted 
by the TIPO in 2004, after 2 years consideration, in a case where the patentees hold an 
absolute monopoly (no other bypass possible) should not be over-interpreted as Taiwan 
pursuing a hostile position against IP holders.66 The handling by the TFTC of warning 
letters issued by IP holders to third parties, requiring that precautionary steps be taken 
before the issuance of such letters is justified because it reduces uncertainty in the market. 
The market would be further better off had the TFTC demanded that the whole of the 
court decision or the expert.opinion regarding patent infringement be attached to the 
warning letter and that the issuer must first have filed suit against the actual infringer. 
Last, but not least, experiences in Taiwan show that, like all economic powers 
unchecked by market forces, multinational conglomerates are tempted to act in an 
inconsiderate and aggressive way when exercising their IP rights, even to conduct anti- 
competitive activities in the name of IP rights and laws and contracts. To counter-balance 
IP superpower and the possible resultant misuse that suffocates market competition and leaves 
the needs of consumers unsatisfied, competition law in Taiwan has proven to be of help. 
66 In the United Kingdom, from 1959 to 1968, there were on average 1.5 applications for compulsory licences 
per year under the general provisions. Only two were granted in ths  period. For food and drugs, there were an 
average of4.1 apphcations per year, and only four were granted. See William Com~sh and David Llewelyn, Zntellectual 
Property, 2nd edition, Sweet 81 Maxwell, London, 2003, at p. 294, footnote 81. In Germany, from the establishment 
of the Federal Patent Court in 1961 to 1991, there were only twelve applications for compulsory licences and only 
one was granted; see George Benkard, Patengexetz, 9th edition, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1993, § 24 Rdnr.5. 
